The equilibrium redistributive policy proposals of two parties with policy preferences is studied. Each party's ideal policy coincides with that of citizens having a particular income level, and the party's utility function reflects its attitude to the trade-off between choice of preferred policy and likelihood of victory. When parties face uncertainty about citizens' abstention from voting, divergent equilibrium proposals are derived which are more moderate than their contrasting ideal policies. Political equilibria under different prior beliefs on abstention are then compared. It is shown that a lower likelihood of abstention in a particular income group induces both parties to make proposals catering to that group, in equilibrium.
Introduction
In politics, parties often modify their courses. A party may take an extreme stance consistent with its principles, or a more moderate stance according to the prevailing circumstances. The 1960s' Democratic administration in the U. S. implemented positive fiscal policies with the slogan "guns and butter" and renounced balanced finance, and the Clinton administration of the 1990s succeeded in cutting Medicare and Medicaid expenses through major legislation and reforms. It appears that these different stances on redistribution by the same party are affected by its assessment of voter concern and behavior.
The literature is rich with models of two-party political competition. Since
Hotelling's (1929) pioneering work, the archetypal conclusion in rational-choice analyses of competition in which the goal of two competing parties is solely to seek office has been convergence of their policy positions toward the median voters' ideal point. In reality, however, parties seldom adopt identical positions, violating the prediction of the median voter theorem. Another body of work has supposed that parties have ideological preferences for policies. Some such works hold with convergence of parties' positions on the typical citizens' ideal point [Wittman (1977) and Calvert (1985) ], but others predict policy divergence [Wittman (1983) , Hansson and Stuart (1984) , Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) , Roemer (1994) , Roemer (1997) , and Roemer (2001) ]. These models aim mainly at reproducing equilibrium policy divergence rather than generating implications for real politics. The exceptions are Roemer (1998) and Roemer (1999) . The former explores how increasing importance of non-economic issues affects parties' choice of redistributive policies, and the latter derives choices of progressive income taxation by both leftist and rightist parties. The present model constructs an existence theorem for politico-economic equilibrium of redistribution, and further shows how the parties' selection of courses is affected by their estimates of abstention, or voting rate, by income group. It is well known that the weather, unforeseen scandals, and media forecasts of electoral outcomes influence citizens' decisions whether to vote. These are the origins of uncertainty that political parties have to face until election day, and they resort to campaign ads which can raise the political awareness of their potential supporters and mobilize supporters to vote. Estimates of abstention by political parties will therefore influence their actions. There does not appear to have been any previous analysis of parties with policy preferences and their own estimates of voter behavior.
In this model, there are two parties with contrasting preferences on redistribution. They represent specific income groups insofar as their ideal policies coincide with the ideal policies of those groups. Based on the income distribution of voters, parties make a binding electoral promise to the entire electorate in the form of a posttax income function with two parameters, and the balanced-budget requirement reduces the policy space to one dimension. Each voter sincerely votes for the party promising him or her the highest posttax income. The winning party implements the policy which it announced in the election campaign. Obviously, in a game with no abstentions and therefore no uncertainty about the proportion of the vote that the parties receive, the unique equilibrium involves each party's choice of the median voters' ideal policy. When the parties face uncertainty about the income distribution of the voters who will actually go to the polls, the parties' equilibrium positions are divergent and located to the side of their respective ideal points. Under the sufficient condition for uniqueness of the equilibrium, political equilibria with different prior beliefs about abstention are compared. It is shown that the parties' common prior belief of a high voting rate among lower-income citizens induces them both to take the equilibrium positions courting more the low-income group, and correspondingly if they expect a high voting rate among higher-income citizens. These results provide a picture of redistributive politics.
The present model is closely related to that of Roemer (1997) . Roemer used a one-dimensional policy space, candidates with policy preferences, and uncertainty about the income distribution of voters, and found equilibrium policy divergence.
Earlier works [e.g., Wittman (1983) and Hansson and Stuart (1984) ] presupposed that each party's probability of victory is concave in its strategy in order to deduce concavity of the payoff function. In contrast, Roemer (1997) derived the probability-of-victory function from microfoundations, but instead supposed that the probability function has a decreasing hazard rate. Instead, it is here suggested that the parties' utility functions embody their attitudes toward the trade-off between ideological contentment and likelihood of victory. This supposition amounts to a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium. In this formulation, as a party moves its position away from the rival's position closer to its ideal point, the ratio of the marginal increase in utility from its deviation to the marginal decrease in the probability of victory itself decreases. This model is at least as plausible as others managing some trade-off.
The basic assumptions of the model concerning the income distribution among the citizens, and the citizens' and parties' preferences for policies, are set out in Section 2. In Section 3, political equilibrium is derived. Section 4 presents conclusions.
Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
The Model
There exists a continuum of citizens. Citizens are considered as similar before nature determines their endowment, which is denoted by x. 1 The probability distribution of x is defined over the real interval X 0 = (0, 1]. Suppose that x is distributed uniformly on X 0 so that the cumulative distribution function F 0 (x) = x and hence the expected value of x is 1 2 . The uniform distribution is posited because it leads us to well-defined solutions. 2 Each citizen is taken to inelastically provide a unit of labor and to earn income whose amount is identical to his endowment. Let us represent a citizen's type by his realized value of x. Define a median voter as type m such that F 0 (m) = 1 2 , i.e., m = 1 2 . Two parties compete for the same office: one is leftist, L, and the other is rightist, R. An electoral competition takes the form of simultaneous offers of posttax incomes. Parties make offers to citizens on the basis of the common prior on the probability distribution of x, which corresponds to F 0 . Each party is committed to implementing its offer if elected. In the case of a tie, a fair coin is flipped to determine a winner.
We define type x's posttax income offered by party i, i ∈ {L, R}, as
where y i (x) ∈ (0, α i ] denotes posttax income guaranteed to type x by party i, and
The parameters β i measures the elasticity of posttax income with respect to pretax income. This measure of tax progression is well-known as the "residual income progression" parameter, first introduced by Musgrave and Thin (1948). 3 If β i = 1, a tax scheme is proportional. As successively lower values of β i are chosen, the tax scheme becomes more progressive, reducing inequality in the resulting posttax income distribution. According to the suppositions on the ranges of α i and β i , ∂y i ∂x > 0 so that x is mapped into y i in the same order. Suppose that transfers are financed purely by taxing citizens' incomes. Then the budget constraint for party i is given by the amount of available resources:
This balanced-budget constraint can be arranged as
and hence it is possible to reduce each party's strategy to the choice of a single real number in the interval β. Define Y (x, β i ) ≡ y i (x). By the proposal β i = 1, each citizen is assured of posttax income equal to his pretax income. As β i approaches zero, the posttax incomes of all citizens converge more closely toward the mean 1 2 . Let the utility of type x from party i's proposal be identical to Y (x, β i ). Letβ x denote type x's most preferred policy, i.e., type x's ideal policy. From (1) and (3),
and the value of (4) is determined by examining the partial derivative of the maximand with respect to z:
It follows from (5) that the maximand in (4) is single-peaked in z ∈ β, implying that Y (x, β i ) is single-peaked in β i ∈ β. By the implicit function theorem for x such that β <β x < β, i.e., for e
so that the ideal policyβ x is monotonous in voter type x.
Suppose that party i's utility depends on the preference of the type that party i represents among the electorate, which is denoted by x i , and the policy to be implemented, β h ∈ {β L , β R }. The utility function of party i is defined by
whereũ(·) is continuously twice differentiable and strictly increasing. It follows from (7) that party i's ideal policy coincides with that of type x i .
It is clear from (6) thatβ x L <β m (= 1 log 2 − 1) <β x R under Assumption 1. Thus, Assumption 1 implies that party L prefers greater progression resulting in less inequality, and party R prefers the opposite.
Let (β L , β R ) signify a set of proposals by the two parties. Voting is carried out after each citizen is informed of both parties' proposals and the realized value of his endowment (which has been supposed to equal his pretax income). Each voter sincerely votes for the party whose offer leads to the greatest utility. Accordingly, type x votes for party i, i ∈ {L, R}, rather than party j, j
. He votes for one of them randomly if the two parties propose the same posttax income. Let V i (β i , β j ) denote the fraction of citizens with x such that Y (x, β i ) > Y (x, β j ), given β i and β j . This corresponds to the fraction of votes party i receives in the absence of abstention. It can be shown that
For a detailed derivation of (8), see the Appendix. From (8) ,
The following lemmas on the change in a party's vote share caused by its deviation derive intuitively from the single-peakedness of citizens' preferences. Formal proofs are given in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 expresses the idea that each party can obtain more votes by moving its policy position closer to its rival's. It also suggests that
∂β j . Lemma 2 shows that V i is continuous on the line β i = β j if and only if party j takes the median voters' ideal policy.
According to the standard approach in the literature on parties with policy preferences, party i's payoff is given by party i's expected utility, which is denoted by W i :
where P i represents party i's probability of winning the election.
The electoral game can now be defined as follows: the strategy set of party i, i ∈ {L, R}, is β and for each pair of strategies (β L , β R ) ∈ β 2 , party i's payoff is
given by W i . The equilibrium concept is Nash. An equilibrium is described as a pair of strategies of parties L and R.
Equilibrium
Suppose first that every citizen casts a vote, so that parties face no uncertainty over their vote shares. Then, party i recognizes P i in (9) as
Consequently, the payoff for party i is taken to be U (x i , β i ) if it wins with policy
by a fair lottery in the case of a tie. Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Suppose that parties L and R face no uncertainty over the distribution of voters who will actually go to the polls. Then
Theorem 1 tells us that when there is no uncertainty over the vote shares the parties receive, each party's equilibrium strategy involves solely the choice of the median voters' ideal policy. Thus, Theorem 1 encapsulates the idea of Hotelling (1929) . To summarize the proof in the Appendix: in the game with policy preferences, given (β L , β R ) = (β m ,β m ), then each party's deviation fromβ m to its more preferred position forces it to lose the competition outright and never raises its
, then one of the two parties has a position which is preferable to its current one and which guides it to certain electoral victory. Thus,
cannot be a candidate for equilibrium. These results follow from the form of (10).
We shall now introduce the uncertainty faced by the parties, following Roemer's Put differently, if s 1 > s 2 , then G(x|s 1 ) > G(x|s 2 ) for any x ∈ (0, 1). Thus, G(·|s 2 ) first-order stochastically dominates G(·|s 1 ). Intuitively, higher s is associated with an income distribution having a higher proportion of the poor, given any definable boundary that divides the electorate into two income groups. One interpretation of s is the impact of campaign ads raising political awareness within the low-income group: with higher s, more low-income citizens turn out to vote.
The derivation of (11) is given in the Appendix. Thus, V s i represents the fraction of voters whose pretax income is below 1+β i
In state s > (<)s, the party with lower proposal wins (loses) the election, since its vote share strictly increases in s, given β L and β R . It is then possible to derive continuity and monotonicity of P L and P R with respect to V L and V R , respectively.
continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in V i .
Accordingly, under Assumptions 1 and 2, party i's choice of strategy affects its payoff (9) in two ways: via a change in P i (β i , β j ), and via a change in U (x i , β i ). From Lemmas 1 and 3, P i (β i , β j ) strictly increases in β i ∈ [β, β j ) and strictly decreases in β i ∈ (β j , β]; it may jump up or down to 1 2 at β i = β j . The utility function U (x i , β i ) strictly increases in β i ∈ [β,β x i ) and strictly decreases in β i ∈ (β x i , β]. Thus, party i has to consider the tactical effect on P i (β i , β j ) and the ideological effect on U (x i , β i ) arising from its decision.
for party i's best reaction. If β j =β x i , the two effects discussed above work in opposite directions on the interval (min{β x i , β j }, max{β x i , β j }) so that the party has to consider the relative strength of these effects when making its choice. Let us measure this by the ratio of the marginal increase in U ( 
The underlying intuition is that when party i comes up against the trade-off, its ideological gain relative to its tactical loss becomes smaller as its choice approaches its ideal policy. We are now ready to construct the existence theorem of political equilibrium under uncertainty, since Assumption 3 provides a sufficient condition 4 Notice that Assumption 3 provides a specification for the parties' utility function, whereas A4 * in Roemer (1997) is an assumption that leads to the probability-of-victory function.
for i's best reaction to be single-valued. Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1 to 3 hold, so that parties L and R face uncertainty over the voters' distribution. Then, an equilibrium (β * L , β * R ) of the game exists witĥ
Theorem 2 tells us that policy-motivated parties, facing uncertainty, propose divergent policies in equilibrium. Figure 1 shows an example of the pair of party L's and party R's reaction curves. It reveals that each party's best reaction against Figure   1 its rival's choice uniquely exists in the interval between its ideal policy and the rival's position. The equilibrium of the game, which is marked by the intersection of the two reaction curves, is certainly inside the triangle drawn with the thick
We now focus on the relation between parties' common prior beliefs about voters' income distribution and these parties' equilibrium strategies. Redefine H as the set of cumulative distribution functions of s which satisfy Assumption 2, and take H 1 ,
Now examine the movement of the equilibrium according to the shift of the parties' prior from H 1 to H 2 . We shall concentrate on the shift such that H 1 (s 1 * ) = H 2 (s 1 * ) where s 1 * ≡ s(V L (β 1 * L , β 1 * R )), i.e., the density at the cutpoint s 1 * is kept constant. 6 Uniqueness of the equilibrium is assumed.
It follows from the discussion so far that ∂W i ∂β i (b i (β j ), β j ) = 0 for β j =β x i . Then, 5 Our results are consistent with Roemer's (1997) conclusion that policy-motivated parties and uncertainty are both needed to generate equilibrium policy divergence. 6 Without the supposition that H 1 (s 1 * ) = H 2 (s 1 * ), more assumptions are needed to demonstrate the movement of the equilibrium, complicating the model.
under Assumption 4, 0
, β j ) < 0, so that L and R's reaction curves intersect only once, as in Figure 1 . Assumption 4 also ensures that political equilibrium is stable.
Recall that higher s is associated with an income distribution having a higher ratio of voters whose income is below a certain level. Accordingly, the lower (higher) value of the cumulative distribution function for fixed s 1 * is associated probabilistically with higher voting rate among the poor (rich). The following theorem suggests that both parties, with prior belief of higher voting rate among the poor, take equilibrium positions closer toβ x L , and vice versa. 
Theorem 3 has two major implications. First, if we classify the electorate into two income groups and if one group is more likely to vote than the other, then the party that favors this group takes a more extreme equilibrium position (closer to its ideology) than it would do otherwise; it has a decent probability of winning despite its radicalization. Second, the equilibrium position of the party con this group shifts to a position more preferred by the group.
Concluding Remarks
The paper has presented a model in which two parties, one leftist and the other rightist, propose tax-transfer schemes in their electoral promises. Redistribution is a major campaign issue since it is of interest to the electorate. Each party represents a group of citizens with a particular income level in the electorate, in that the party's ideal policy coincides with that of the group. It is assumed that the ideal policy of the leftist (rightist) party is more (less) redistributive than that of the median voter. However, the parties' policy preferences are not identical to those 
A Appendix

A.1 Formal Proofs
there exists an interval x with strictly positive length such that β i <β x < β j and
Then,
From (A2), the limit of i's share of the vote when it moves its policy position toward j's position from below is given by 
. Thus, i's deviation never raises its payoff, and (β m ,β m ) is indeed an equilibrium of the game.
Next we shall show that any pair (β L , β R ) = (β m ,β m ) is not an equilibrium.
from Assumption 1; this deviation thus enables R to win the election outright and implement its preferred policy. The case where min{β L , β R } >β m is analogous. 
L's deviation toβ m sustains L's victory and also leads to implementation of its more
. Thus R can increase its payoff by choosing a policy which is closer to its ideal policy and wins the election.
R's deviation toβ m enables R to win the election outright and implement its more
. Thus R can increase its payoff by choosing the policy which enables R to win.
These results prove that (β L , β R ) = (β m ,β m ) is not an equilibrium of the game.
The assertion on each party's vote share and its probability of winning is immediately derived from (8) and (10) .
, V i is mapped onto s in a one-to-one manner according to Assumption 2. Then, from the implicit function theorem, ∂s
Let β i > β j . Then 1−G(1−V i |s) = 1−G(V j |s). By definition, 1−G(V j |s(V j )) = 1 2 and hence P i = H (s(V j )). Thus, P i strictly increases in V i since ∂V j ∂V i < 0. Continuous differentiability of P i with respect to V i stems from continuous differentiability of H(·) and G(·|·). Clearly 0 < P i < 1 from the supposition that 0 < s < 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. Define
and i can increase its payoff by taking its ideal policy.
Next, let β j =β x i . Let β i ∈ β/I and |β i − β j | < |β i −β x i |, so that β i is located on the side of β j . Then β i is not a best strategy, since U (x i , β i ) < U(x i , β j ) and party i can increase its payoff by choosing the same policy as j's. Let β i ∈ β/I and |β i − β j | > |β i −β x i |, so that β i is located on the side ofβ x i . Then β i is not a best strategy, since
. Party i can therefore increase its payoff by taking its ideal policy.
Proof of Theorem 2. We shall prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the do-
the triangle drawn with thick dotted lines in Figure 1 ). This leads us to Theorem 2.
The strategy is to show that (i) each party has a single-valued and continuous best reaction in β to any strategy by the rival in β; that (ii) by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, a pair of strategies which constitutes a Nash equilibrium exists in β 2 ; but that (iii) any pair of strategies contained in β 2 /D is not a Nash equilibrium.
(i) In Lemma 4, it was shown that W i does not have a maximizer in β/I against any β j ∈ β. In particular, it was shown in the proof of Lemma 4 that, given β j =β x i , W i is maximized solely byβ x i . It will now be shown that, given β j =β x i , W i has a single-valued maximizer within (min{β
It is clear from the continuity of P i (·, ·) and U (
is continuous for all points (β L , β R ) where β L = β R . We will adapt Lemma 1 of Roemer (1997) to our framework and assure the continuity of W i (·, ·) for all points (β L , β R ) ∈ β 2 and the existence of the maximizer of W i (·, β j ) in the interval I.
Lemma A1 [Roemer (1997) 
As the second step, the following lemmas show that β i = β j or β i =β x i is not i's best strategy for β j with β j =β x i . Lemma A2. Given β j =β x i , β j is never a maximizer of W i .
Proof. By definition, any convex combination of U (x i ,β x i ) and U (x i , β j ) with positive weights takes a higher value than U (x i , β j ). Therefore
and party i can increase its payoff by taking its ideal policy.
from lemmas 1 and 3 and ∂U ∂β i (x i ,β x i ) = 0, so that party i can increase its payoff by
From Lemma 4 and Lemmas A1 to A3, we have a candidate for the maximizer of W i (·, β j ), i.e., i's best reaction, in the interval (min{β x i , β j }, max{β x i , β j }) given β j =β x i . To derive an existence theorem, it suffices to show that the maximizer is convex-valued in the interval. On the interval (β j ,β x i ) or (β x i , β j ), the partial derivative of W i with respect to β i is given by
Let β j <β x i . Then, for β i ∈ (β j ,β x i ), ∂P i ∂β i < 0 from Lemmas 1 and 3, U (x i , β i ) − U (x i , β j ) > 0, and the sign of (A5) depends on the sign of 1+
Then, we have three possibilities: on the interval (β j ,β x i ), 1 +
; it is negative ( ∂W i ∂β i is positive); or it changes from the negative value to the positive one ( ∂W i ∂β i changes from the positive value to the negative one) as β i increases. Suppose that 1 +
. It thus follows that ∂W i ∂β i changes from the positive value to the negative one as β i increases in the interval (β j ,β x i ), i.e., there is a unique
is strictly quasiconcave on the interval (β j ,β x i ), and party i has a unique best reaction b i in the interval.
> 0, and the sign of (A5) depends on the sign of 1+
strictly increases in β i and |η i | weakly increases in β i , so that 1 + P i U (x i ,β i )−U(x i ,β j ) η i strictly decreases in β i . It follows in the same manner that W i (·, β j ) is strictly quasiconcave on the interval (β x i , β j ), and party i has a unique best reaction in the interval.
To summarize, i has a unique best reaction in β for any β j ∈ β: this exists in
(ii) As in Assumption 4, denote party i's best reaction function for every β j ∈ β by b i (β j ). Continuity of b i (·) stems from continuity of W i (·, ·), which was proved in Lemma A1.
. This function is a map from the nonempty, compact, and convex set β 2 onto itself. Functions β L (·) and β R (·) are continuous, so that b(·, ·) is continuous. All the conditions of Brouwer's fixed point theorem are satisfied, so that a fixed point (β * L , β * R ) ∈ β 2 exists such that
, constituting a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Then there exists an equilibrium
Proof of Theorem 3. From Assumption 4 and Theorem 2, it follows that the equilibrium (β k * L , β k * R ), k = 1, 2, exists and is unique and thatβ x L < β k * L < β k * R <β x R . Denote party i's probability of winning with H k by P k i . Then the equilibrium (β k * L , β k * R ) satisfies the following condition:
where i ∈ {L, R} and j ∈ {L, R|j = i}.
Now let (A6) hold with k = 1. Suppose that H 1 (s 1 * ) > H 2 (s 1 * ). Then since ∂U ∂β L (x L , β 1 * L ) < 0 and P 1 L (β 1 * L , β 1 * R ) < P 2 L (β 1 * L , β 1 * R ). To recover the equality, party L has to choose β L (< β 1 * L ) rather than β 1 * L for given β 1 * R due to the strict quasiconcavity of W L (·, β 1 * R ).
Let i = R and j = L. Given (β 1 * L , β 1 * R ), with the prior of H 2 , then
since ∂U ∂β R (x R , β 1 * R ) > 0 and P 1 R (β 1 * R , β 1 * L ) > P 2 R (β 1 * R , β 1 * L ). To recover the equality, party R has to choose β R (< β 1 * R ) rather than β 1 * R for given β 1 * L due to the strict quasiconcavity of W R (·, β 1 * L ).
From these discussions, with the common prior of H 2 , L's and R's reaction curves pass through (β L , β 1 * R ) and (β 1 * L , β R ) respectively. In Figure 2 , consider four quadrants around (β 1 * L , β 1 * R ). It follows from Assumption 4 that there is no equilibrium Figure   2 with H 2 in the southeast, northwest, or northeast quadrants since the two parties' reaction curves under H 2 cannot intersect in those quadrants. Therefore, there exists (β 2 * L , β 2 * R ) in the southwest quadrant of (β 1 * L , β 1 * R ), and (β 1 * L , β 1 * R ) (β 2 * L , β 2 * R ). The case where H 1 (s 1 * ) < H 2 (s 1 * ) can be treated in a similar manner.
A.2 Parties' Share of the Vote without Uncertainty (Derivation of (8))
From (1) and (3), type x prefers β i to β j if and only if 1 + β i 2
that is, iff
If β i < β j , (A10) can be rewritten as
and the probability of (A11) is given by F 0
corresponds to party i's share of the vote.
If β i > β j , (A10) is rewritten as
and the probability of (A12) is given by 1 − F 0
Finally, if β i = β j , type x votes for party i with probability 1 2 .
A.3 Parties' Share of the Vote with Uncertainty (Derivation of (11))
If β i < β j , then from (A11), V s i (β i , β j |s) is given by
If β i > β j , then from (A12), V s i (β i , β j |s) is given by
If β i = β j , the voter votes for one of i and j randomly and hence V s i (β i , β j |s) = 1 2 .
[ 
